In the literature of voluntarily repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, the focus is on how long-term cooperation is established, when newly matched partners cannot know the past actions of each other. In this paper we investigate how non-cooperative and cooperative players co-exist. In many incomplete information versions of a similar model, inherently non-cooperative players are assumed to exist in the society, but their long-run fitness has not been analyzed. In reality and in experiments, we also observe that some people are cooperative, while others never cooperate. We show that a bimorphic equilibrium of the most cooperative strategy and the most myopic strategy exists for sufficiently high survival rate of players, and that it is evolutionarily stable under uncoordinated mutations. For lower survival rates, adding initial periods of defection makes similar bimorphic equilibria. Abstract: In the literature of voluntarily repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, the focus is on how long-term cooperation is established, when newly matched partners cannot know the past actions of each other. In this paper we investigate how non-cooperative and cooperative players co-exist. In many incomplete information versions of a similar model, inherently non-cooperative players are assumed to exist in the society, but their long-run fitness has not been analyzed. In reality and in experiments, we also observe that some people are cooperative, while others never cooperate. We show that a bimorphic equilibrium of the most cooperative strategy and the most myopic strategy exists for sufficiently high survival rate of players, and that it is evolutionarily stable under uncoordinated mutations. For lower survival rates, adding initial periods of defection makes similar bimorphic equilibria. Both types of equilibria confirm persistence of defectors.
INTRODUCTION
Society is not uniform in behavior. In particular, even though the situation makes it clear that mutual cooperation is efficient, still some people may behave differently. In many Prisoner's Dilemma and Trust Game experiments, there are different behaviors among subjects; some are cooperative, while others are non-cooperative.
1 In real-life transactions also, there is persistent presence of cheaters, even though cheating is detected and punished.
It is too easy to attribute such diversity (co-existence of contrasting patterns of behavior)
to external causes such as mistakes, framing, or incomplete learning. We can alternatively postulate that behavioral diversity has its own merit and thus will survive in the long run.
Theoretically, it is also important to investigate how fundamentally asymmetric strategy combinations fare in a symmetric model. In ordinary repeated or random matching game of Prisoner's Dilemma, co-existence of cooperative and non-cooperative strategies are not an equilibrium. In ordinary infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 2 , the C-trigger strategy and the strategy that defects after any history both constitute a symmetric equilibrium on its own, but together they do not constitute an equilibrium.
3 Namely, the C-trigger strategy is not a best reply to the D-always strategy. In the random matching game with the Prisoner's Dilemma as the stage game 4 , it is possible to construct a cooperative equilibrium with a more complex strategy than the C-trigger, but if some players in the society always defect, then starting the game with cooperation is not a best reply. Some 1 For surveys, see Camerer (2003) and Ledyard (1995) . Recent experiments of infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma include Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2012) . The latter found co-existence of cooperative and non-cooperative strategies when monitoring is imperfect. Gächter et al. (2011) gives experimental results of Trust game (gift exchange) situations with diverse behaviors. Biologists also find such behavioral diversity, e.g., Dobata et al. (2009) . Genetically not so different L (cheater)-type ants seem to move from one colony to another to exploit S (normal)-type ants. Izquierdo et al. (2010 Izquierdo et al. ( , 2013 and references therein show simulation results which we can interpret as co-existence of cooperators and defectors (although in a restricted set of strategies).
2 For a "perfect folk theorem", see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) . A good survey of various repeating mechanisms is given in Mailath and Samelson (2006) .
3 To be precise, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in which some players use the C-trigger and others use the D-always strategy.
4 See Kandori (1992) , Ellison (1994) , and Harrington (1995) for a finite population model, and OkunoFujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) and Takahashi (2010) for a continuum population model. Recently, Deb (2012) provides a folk theorem with general stage games and cheap talk. All these are non-evolutionary, rational player models.
incomplete information versions of voluntarily repeated Prisoner's Dilemma assumed that
inherently non-cooperative players exist in the society (e.g., Ghosh and Ray, 1996, and Kranton, 1996) , but their long-run fitness has not been analyzed.
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Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009) , henceforth Greve-Okuno, showed that the Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma framework admits many polymorphic (asymmetric) equilibria in a symmetric single population model. 6 The key is the endogenous length of repeated interactions. Cooperative players get exploited by defectors but such a partnership is terminated quickly, while a match with another cooperative player will last a long time. Therefore defection against a cooperator may not give a high payoff in the long-run. Greve-Okuno (2009) focused on trust-building strategies, which cooperate after some periods of defection, and showed the existence of polymorphic equilibria among them by the above logic.
In this paper, we include fundamentally non-cooperative strategies in the analysis. The polymorphic trust-building equilibria in Greve-Okuno (2009) emerge due to mis-coordination of the initial trust-building periods, but the underlying norm is the same for all players, to eventually find someone to cooperate with each other for a long time. Here, we investigate a more fundamentally bimorphic equilibrium, in which some players never intend to cooperate, while others try to establish a long-term cooperative relationship with a stranger.
Although the contrasting bimorphic distribution is vulnerable to a coordinated invasion of mutants/entrants (Vesely and Yang, 2012) , we show that it is robust against a class of "diverse" polymorphic entrants. The class includes strategy distributions resulting when every player randomly and independently experiments with various trust-building strategies as well as strategy distributions with only defection and escape at some point. This stability concept is related to generalized dynamics of selection and directed mutation (e.g., Samuelson and Zhang, 1992 , Weibull, 1995 , and Samuelson, 1997 . Our bimorphic equi-5 There are other kinds of incomplete information models of endogenous partnership formation, e.g., Cho and Matsui (2009, 2013) and McAdams (2011) . In those models, randomly matched partners discover the match quality after matching. Hence there is no fixed "types" in such models.
6 There are also infinitely many symmetric trust-building equilibria, which is one of the main findings of Greve-Okuno (2009). librium thus justifies the existence of inherently non-cooperative players in evolutionary setting and gives a foundation to well-documented behavioral diversity.
We also show that the contrasting-strategy equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to countably many polymorphic equilibria involving various lengths of trust-building strategies. This is due to the same play path being induced on the most cooperative strategy, and the recursive structure of the dynamic game, i.e., the continuation payoff after ending a partnership is the same as the lifetime payoff, because all new partnerships start with a null history.
Hence, if two strategies give the same lifetime payoff at the null history, then breaching into either of them at a later period in the matching pool also gives the same continuation payoff. Interestingly, only the contrasting-bimorphic distribution is locally stable whenever it exists. Other equivalent distributions are locally stable only in a smaller range of survival rates (discount factors) of players. Thus, the simple but fundamentally contrasting strategy combination is quite stable.
When the survival rate is not as high as the level that sustains the contrasting-strategy bimorphic equilibrium, adding trust-building periods to both strategies makes similar equilibria. Therefore, in a wide range of survival rates, fundamentally different behavior patterns are persistent.
Our game can be called a large social game. Jackson and Watts (2010) formulated a social game in which players not only choose strategies but also with whom to play the game. While their model is finite (one-shot or finitely repeated game by finite populations) and assumes a lot of information among players, ours is infinite in both horizon and the number of players and assumes minimal information. However, our purpose of the study is in accordance with one of theirs: we analyze how endogeneity of partnerships affects the play of the game.
Infinite horizon social games are also studied by Cho and Matsui (2012, 2013) .
7 In their models, players are not homogeneous. Pairs are randomly formed from two finite populations, and the only strategic decisions are whether to keep the relationship or unilaterally terminate it, depending on the realized value of a match. Thus their focus is how players settle with a "partnership value". By contrast, we show that some players end up in longterm cooperative partnerships, while others never settle down, even though all players have the same characteristics (the set of strategies and the payoff function).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (VSRPD) model, introduced by Greve-Okuno (2009), and define focal strategies. In Section 3 we apply standard evolutionary stability concepts to the contrasting strategy combination of the most cooperative and the most myopic strategy. In Section 4, we define an evolutionary stability concept with respect to a set of entrant distributions and derive a sufficient set of diverse entrant distributions against which the contrasting strategy equilibrium is robust. In Section 5 we show payoff-equivalent distributions to the focal equilibrium and show local instability of the former. In Section 6, we look at lower survival rates than the one for the contrasting-bimorphic equilibrium to exist and show that our analysis can be extended. Section 7 gives concluding remarks.
All proofs are in Appendix.
MODEL

Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
In this section we describe the model of Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (VSRPD) introduced by Greve-Okuno (2009) . Consider a large society of a continuum of homogeneous players of measure 1, over the infinite, discrete time horizon. At the beginning of each period, players are either matched with a partner from the previous period or without a partner. Those without a partner enter a random matching process and form pairs 8 to play the following extensive form game.
Newly matched players have no knowledge of the past action history of each other, and they play the ordinary two-action Prisoner's Dilemma of Table 1 . The actions in the Prisoner's Dilemma are observable only by the current partners. After observing the actions in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the partners simultaneously choose whether to keep the partnership (action k) or to end it (action e). The partnership dissolves if at least one partner chooses action e. In addition, at the end of a period, each player may exit from the society for some exogenous reason (which we call a "death") with probability 1 − δ, where 0 < δ < 1. If a player dies, a new player enters into the society, keeping the population size The outline of VSRPD is depicted in Figure 1 .
The one-shot payoffs in the Prisoner's Dilemma are in Table 1 , where g > c > d > ℓ and 2c ≧ g + ℓ. The latter makes the symmetric pure-action profile (C, C) efficient. The game continues with probability δ from an individual player's point of view. Thus we focus on the expected total/average payoff, with δ being the effective discount factor of a player.
Under the no-information-flow assumption, we focus on match-independent strategies 9 that only depend on the period t = 1, 2, . . . within a partnership (not the calendar time in the whole game) and the private history of actions within a partnership. Let
t−1 be the set of partnership histories 10 at the beginning of t ≧ 2 and let 9 Since the population is a continuum, "contagious" strategies used in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) The set of pure strategies of VSRPD is denoted as S and the set of all strategy distributions in the population is denoted as ∆(S). A pure strategy can be viewed as a degenerate strategy distribution and thus belongs to ∆(S) as well. Hence we can write a strategy combination of a strategy distribution and a pure strategy as αp + (1 − α)s.
We assume that each player uses a pure strategy, which is natural in an evolutionary game and simplifies the analysis. We allow entrants/mutants to be a distribution of pure strategies. (See Section 4 below.)
We investigate evolutionary stability of stationary strategy distributions in the matching pool. Although the strategy distribution in the matching pool may be different from the distribution in the entire society, if the former is stationary, the distribution of various states of matches is also stationary, thanks to the stationary death process. 11 Since each player is born into the random matching pool, the life-time payoff is determined by the strategy distribution in the matching pool. 
Average and Lifetime Payoffs
Next, consider a player endowed with strategy s ∈ S in the matching pool, waiting to be matched randomly with a partner. When the stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool is p ∈ ∆(S), we write the expected total discounted value of payoff streams s expects to receive during his lifetime as V (s; p) and the average per period payoff s expects to receive during his lifetime as
is the expected lifetime of s.
Thanks to the stationary distribution in the matching pool, we can write V (s; p) as a recursive equation. If p has a finite/countable support, then we can write 
Hence the average payoff is a nonlinear function of the strategy distribution p:
.
Cooperating and Non-cooperating Strategies
We investigate stability of fundamental behavioral diversity, in the sense that some players are cooperative, while others never cooperate. For cooperative strategies, Greve-Okuno in which all players play C in the first period of a partnership. (Lemma 1 of Greve-Okuno (2009) .) This is due to the lack of information flow across partnerships. Therefore, to consider cooperative monomorphic equilibria, it is natural to focus on the above trust-building strategies, with initial D play.
In this paper, we turn to polymorphic equilibria, with as much cooperation as possible.
Thus, we investigate how equilibria including c 0 -strategy, which starts the cooperation phase immediately with a stranger, can be sustained. In order to constitute an equilibrium, some players must play D in a new partnership. Since Greve-Okuno (2009) had already considered equilibria with different length trust-building strategies, and trust-building strategies all have the same idea to establish a long-term cooperative relationship eventually, we look at a completely opposite type strategy, namely to defect and run away immediately, to be matched with c 0 -strategy. The defect-and-run d 0 -players are often observed in experiments and real markets, and often assumed to occupy a positive fraction in the society (permanently) in incomplete information versions of VSRPD (e.g., Ghosh and Ray, 1996 , Kranton, 1996 , and Rob and Yang, 2010 . 14 However, it has not been investigated whether such myopic type players can fare as well as "rational" players, such as c 0 -strategy.
13 For the precise definition, see Section 3. 14 Often, the motivation of incomplete information models is different from ours. Our idea is that the myopic types are plausible and may fare well, while Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Kranton (1996) introduced myopic types in order to induce rational types to play a symmetric, cooperative equilibrium.
STABILITY UNDER MONOMORPHIC ENTRANTS
We investigate evolutionary stability of the most contrasting strategy combination, consisting of c 0 -and d 0 -strategy. These strategies are polar types in behavior: c 0 -players cooperate with any stranger and d 0 -players never cooperate with anyone and change partners every period. Economic examples of such diversity can be found in many markets. For example, in the internet markets, most of the sellers and buyers would play c 0 -strategy to do honest transactions even when they met for the first time, while some try to cheat and run away, that is, to play d 0 -strategy. The abundance of incomplete information models with d 0 -strategy as the irrational type suggests how plausible they are.
In this section we consider some standard stability concepts. First, we define Nash equilibrium in VSRPD model.
DEFINITION 4 : A stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool p ∈ ∆(S) is a
Nash equilibrium if, for all s ∈ supp(p) and all s
From the evolutionary perspective, a Nash equilibrium is a robust distribution against single (measure zero) entrants/mutants. Let us introduce stronger stability concepts which require robustness against a positive measure of entrants/mutants. Different stability concepts are obtained by the difference in the potential set of entrants.
DEFINITION 5 : A stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool p ∈ ∆(S) is a locally stable Nash equilibrium if, (i) p is a Nash equilibrium; and
, and 
The local stability requires that, if one of the incumbent strategies increases its share by a small fraction ϵ, then all other incumbent strategies fare at least as well as the increased strategy and some fare strictly better, so that the evolutionary pressure restores the share balance. In other words, local stability requires that the distribution is stable against a positive measure of entrants using one of the incumbent strategies. (See also Figure 2 .)
The underlying dynamic we assume is as follows. Occasionally, a newborn player is endowed with a different strategy than her predecessor's, when entering the matching pool. Let ϵ be the measure of such "entrants/mutants" and their strategy 15 be s ′ . In the "medium"-run the population adjusts to yield a stationary post-entry distribution
(1 − ϵ)p + ϵs ′ in the matching pool (where p is the incumbent distribution). After that, in the "long"-run, the selection pressure works according to the post-entry average fitness
In our companion paper (Fujiwara-Greve et al., 2013) , it is shown that for sufficiently large δ, there is a locally stable Nash equilibrium consisting of c 0 -and d 0 -strategy. Fujiwara-Greve et al., 2013) There exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any δ ∈ 15 In the later analysis we allow entrants to have a distribution of strategies.
REMARK 1 (
is the unique locally stable Nash equilibrium with the support {c 0 , d 0 }. Let the smallest such
The intuition is as follows. Let α be the (stationary) fraction of c 0 -strategy and the rest be d 0 -strategy in the matching pool. The average payoff of the two strategies are as follows.
To explain (1) (2013) . 16 Only the larger intersection satisfies the local stability as Figure 2 shows. In sum, the assumption of the existence of myopic players in the incomplete information models can be endogenized. The key is the assortative match among cooperative players, which leads to the concavity of their average payoffs.
However, the locally stable bimorphic Nash equilibrium α cd (δ)c 0 + {1 − α cd (δ)}d 0 does not satisfy neutral stability, which requires stability against any entrant strategy.
16 A general version is proved in Lemma 2 in Appendix of this paper. 
REMARK 2 For any
17
Notice that, this is a "coordinated" invasion that all entrants/mutants play the same strategy, c 1 . Alternatively, entry/mutation may be uncoordinated, consisting of multiple strategies. In the next section we consider stability under uncoordinated invasions.
STABILITY UNDER DIVERSE ENTRANTS
We extend the analysis to allow entrants with different strategies appearing simultaneously.
There are many scenarios that make this happen. If the players are humans, they may experiment with (or make mistakes to play) different strategies at the same time. If the players are not so conscious decision-makers, still it is possible that multiple genes mutate simultaneously to a variety of behavior patterns. Monomorphic entrants require precise coordination among them to play the same strategy, while polymorphic entrants do not need coordination. We thus think that polymorphic entrants/mutations are more likely to evolve spontaneously.
For example, when some entrants play c 1 -strategy, other entrants may imitate it to play one period of trust-building (i.e., defect but keep the partnership if (D, D) is observed) and, if the partnership continued to the second period, they defect and run away. In this case, the post-entry payoff of c 1 -strategy is reduced and moreover its "exploiter" may not fare that well against the incumbents, either.
In general, we formulate a class of exploiters against c T -strategies as follows. 
Notice 
The average payoff of c 1 -strategy can be arranged as a weighted sum of v cd (d 0 ; x c 0 ) and
where
] .
14 From (5) and (6), the signs of the second terms of v(c 1 ; p P E ) and v(d 1 ; p P E ) determine whether they are more or less than v(d 0 ; p P E ). Sufficiently small q c 1 implies that the second terms are negative, so that the incumbent d 0 -strategy has higher average payoff than that of both entrant strategies. Moreover,
implies that c 0 -strategy earns even higher average payoff than d 0 -strategy does (see Figure 2) . Therefore, all incumbents can have higher post-entry average payoff than all entrants, when the relative share of c 1 against d 1 is sufficiently small.
The above example indicates that if entrants/mutants are diverse in such a way that c T -strategies are sufficiently less than its exploiters, then the c 0 -d 0 -equilibrium cannot be invaded. Thus we consider a stability concept with respect to a set of possible (polymorphic) entrant/mutant distributions. 
In words, any new (polymorphic) entrants/mutants from M cannot thrive, and after selection, local stability restores the balance among incumbents. The standard concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy corresponds to the most stringent case such that M = ∆(S).
Our stability concept can probably be connected to limits of some monotone dynamic processes with (a direction of) mutation, similar to the one considered in Samuelson and Zhang (1992) , as ESS can be connected to stable points of monotone dynamic processes (e.g., replicator dynamic). As Samuelson (1997) surveys, however, even the latter connection is weak, i.e., for general games, the stable points of monotone dynamic processes do not coincide with ESS. In addition, the medium-run and long-run process, which seems to be most appropriate for the dynamic process of matching pool strategy distribution formation and selection of strategies, cannot be characterized by a single differential equation.
Izquierdo, Izquierdo, and Vega-Redondo (2013) restricted attention to stationary Markov strategies and obtained a connection between Nash distributions and limit stationary points of a monotone dynamic with completely mixed mutations. By contrast, in order to include as many strategies as possible in the analysis, we adopt the "static" stability.
We now specify a sufficient set of polymorphic entrants/mutants that makes the locally stable equilibrium p * = α cd (δ)c 0 + {1 − α cd (δ)}d 0 evolutionarily stable. But before doing that, we claim that the following set of c T -and d T -strategies is sufficient for the stability analysis of the c 0 -d 0 equilibrium:
The c T -strategies are important for their "secret handshake" property to earn high payoffs among themselves, after imitating d t -strategies with t ≦ T − 1, while d T -strategies are important for their "short run" property to exploit c t -strategies with t ≦ T . For any T = 0, 1, . . ., d t -strategy with t ≧ T and c t -strategy with t ≧ T + 1 behave the same way against c T -strategy, and hence we sometimes combine their shares in a distribution x
is Evolutionarily Stable against Polymorphic Entrants within M.
To interpret E(δ), if some c T -strategy is present in the entrant distribution, the entrants also include sufficiently many exploiters of c T -strategy, so that the ratio
is below α cd (δ). Specifically, if c 1 -strategy is present in the entrant distribution, then sufficiently large share of the entrant distribution has d T (T ≧ 1) or c T -strategies (T ≧ 2) to reduce the payoff of c 1 -strategy. Alternatively, c T -strategies (T ≧ 1) can be absent in the entrant distribution, while some of d T -strategies must be present.
Such diversity among entrants can arise in natural extensions of existing mutation processes which put a positive probability on all strategies every period, including the one considered in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) . In a finite population, finite strategy model as that of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) , it would eventually allow a coordination on a strategy, but, in our infinite population and infinite strategy model, no eventual coordination is warranted and, instead, the diversity of entrants is likely to induce a distribution in E(δ). An alternative justification of diverse entrants is that newly entered players do not have a common norm and end up with various strategies.
Let us give a simple example of a class of mutation processes which can put a positive probability on each strategy in S ∞ cd . Take any real number γ ∈ (0, 1] and a "base" strategy c T , for some T ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. Consider a "branching" mutation process, which randomizes between strategies in a particular order but with a fixed relative probability. The probability to mutate/experiment to play c T -strategy is γ, and the rest of the probability 1 − γ is concentrated on the set {d T , c T +1 , d T +1 , . . .}. Among these, the mutation process chooses d T with relative probability γ (the absolute probability is then (1 − γ)γ), and the rest is concentrated on the set {c T +1 , d T +1 , c T +2 , . . .}, in which c T +1 is chosen with the relative probability γ, and so on. The resulting entrant/mutant distribution takes the following geometric form:
Then for any t = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
When γ = 1, the branching process generates a coordinated entrant, and as γ → 0, it generates "uniform distribution" entrants. Any branching mutation process with γ < α cd (δ)
generates an entrant distribution in E(δ).
Other possible mutation processes that yield an entrant distribution in E(δ) include ones that only generate d T -strategies (singleton or any mixture) and ones that generate finitely many c T -, c T +1 -, . . ., c T +k -strategies and the exploiter d T +k -strategy (for some T ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}), with sufficiently large probability of d T +k -strategy. This class includes the example at the beginning of this section.
Weibull (1995), Example 2.4, shows that in ordinary evolutionary games (random matching with one-shot game), an ESS, which is robust against a single strategy mutation, is not necessarily resistant against simultaneous multiple mutations. We can interpret Proposition 1 as giving an "opposite" example such that, although a distribution is vulnerable to entry of a single strategy, it is robust against a class of mixed strategy entrants including the successful pure strategy. This is thanks to the recursive structure of VSRPD:
If c 1 -strategy can exploit d 0 -strategy, then d 1 -or c 2 -strategy can exploit c 1 -strategy, and so on, even in a symmetric society.
Finally, we show that the above logic does not hold for d T -monomorphic Nash equilibrium for any T . That is, d T -monomorphic Nash equilibrium in not robust against not only coordinated c T +1 -strategy entrant (an analogue of Lemma 2 of Greve-Okuno, 2009), but also mixed entrants of c T +1 -strategy and d T +1 -strategy.
REMARK 3 : For any T < ∞, let p
Hence the "terminating" equilibria of d T -monomorphic distributions are unstable 20 with respect to the same set of entrants which makes the c 0 -d 0 equilibrium stable.
INSTABILITY OF PAYOFF-EQUIVALENT DISTRIBUTIONS
The special feature of the bimorphic equilibrium of c 0 -d 0 distribution is not only that it has very contrasting strategies. The bimorphic distribution has countably many payoffequivalent polymorphic distributions, which is shown below. The payoff-equivalence is due to the recursive structure of VSRPD. However, all payoff-equivalent distributions turned out to be locally unstable near δ c 0 d 0 , because c 0 -strategy can increase its share and its average payoff. This is an additional support to the significance of the c 0 -d 0 equilibrium.
First, we show that the bimorphic equilibrium of c 0 -d 0 distribution is payoff-equivalent to the following form of "geometric" distributions
The α t 's are the relative ratio of c t -strategy against strategies that play D in the first t periods of a match.
LEMMA 1 For any δ ∈ (δ c 0 d 0 , 1), and any
, all relative ratios of c t -strategies (t = 1, 2, . . . , T ) are α cd (δ). Then, for any t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
The point is that the average payoff of a c t -strategy (t = 1, 2, . . . , T ) and d T -strategy can be decomposed as a weighted sum, as in the proof of Proposition 1. For example, the average payoff of c 1 -strategy under the distribution p
the average payoff of c 1 -and c 0 -strategy coincide. An illustration of payoff decomposition and equivalence is given in Figure 3 for the case of T = 2, where v M stands for the average payoff starting in the matching pool. 
Since c 0 -d 0 equilibrium is locally stable for any δ > δ c 0 d 0 , this is an additional support for the significance of the contrasting strategy distribution. The idea of the proof is to show
As Figure 4 illustrates for the case of T = 1 (i.e., the incumbent distribution is α cd (δ)c 0 + 
0, c 0 -strategy has strictly higher average payoff than others. However, as δ increases, the derivative ∂v(c 0 ;p P E ) ∂ϵ | ϵ=0 declines, so that only near δ c0d0 , the above inequality holds.
Notice that the limit case (T = ∞) of the equivalent distribution is the infinitepolymorphic distribution of trust-building strategies Greve-Okuno (2009) . In Greve-Okuno (2009), stability of the infinite-polymorphic distribution was shown by changing the common relative fraction of all incumbent strategies simultaneously. This stability was not exactly the local stability, and the above analysis clarifies that the distribution is not locally stable for a range of δ. Greve- Okuno (2009) showed that a monomorphic distribution of c T -strategy is a Nash equilibrium if and only if playing D in the cooperation phase is not better than following the cooperation phase, i.e.,
GENERAL BIMORPHIC EQUILIBRIA AND EQUIVALENT DISTRIBUTIONS
(7) is called the Best Reply Condition. Clearly when T = 0, it is not satisfied. Since
BR is constant, there is a lower bound to T above which the Best Reply Condition is satisfied. Specifically, for any
Then for any T ≧ τ (δ), c T -strategy played by all players is a Nash equilibrium. Now, for T slightly less than τ (δ), we have a c T -d T equilibrium as follows.
PROPOSITION 3
There exists δ * ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any δ ∈ (δ * , 1), there exists
a locally stable Nash equilibrium.
Let us give an intuition of the proof (see also Figure 5 ). Since d T -strategy can be interpreted as a one-step deviation from c T -strategy, at Figure 6 shows a parametric summary of equilibrium existence. 24 We also have a similar payoff-equivalence result to Lemma 1 for c T -d T -equilibrium.
COROLLARY 1 For any
δ ∈ (δ * , 1), the locally stable Nash equilibrium α T (δ)c T + {1 − α T (δ)}d T ,
if exists, is payoff-equivalent to the infinitely-many trust-building strategy distribution of the form
In summary, for a wide range of δ, we can extend the analyses in Sections 4-5 to bimorphic equilibria consisting of a cooperative c T -strategy and non-cooperative d T -strategy.
Hence co-existence of contrasting behavior patterns is persistent. As in the case of c 0 -d 0 equilibrium (and as Vesely and Yang, 2012 , points out), c T +1 -strategy can invade the c T -d T equilibrium, but the pure-strategy invasion is a coordinated entrant. There should be also "self-destructing" set of polymorphic entrants against which c T -d T equilibrium is robust. Since there are infinitely many strategies to potentially emerge, such mis-coordination is plausible.
Seemingly different equilibria are not fundamentally different. The contrasting bimorphic equilibrium is payoff equivalent to countably many distributions including trustbuilding strategies. The point is the "recursive" structure of the VSRPD model. Players 25 Unlike many of the related literature, we did not restrict the stability analysis within Markov strategies.
entering the matching pool nullify the past and thus the continuation payoff after ending a partnership is the same as the life time payoff. Therefore ending the partnership or keeping (renegotiating) it to shift to cooperation can be payoff equivalent. This is a key feature of the VSRPD model.
Among the payoff-equivalent distributions, the contrasting bimorphic equilibrium is the only locally stable equilibrium whenever it exists. Near the boundary of δ c0d0 , which admits payoff equivalence of c 0 -and d 0 -strategy, c 0 -strategy is more advantageous than other strategies unless the only other strategy present is d 0 -strategy. In our companion paper, Fujiwara-Greve et al. (2013), we also show that, among various equilibrium combinations of c 0 -, d 0 -, and c 1 -strategy, the c 0 -d 0 equilibrium can be most efficient over a broad range of parameter values, even without the consideration of the complexity or psychological cost to implement a c 1 -strategy. The idea is that if the size of the "stake" g − c is not so large, even if players can coordinate on the monomorphic c 1 -equilibrium, one-period trust building by the whole society is costly. Therefore, in this case, the c 0 -d 0 equilibrium is not only stable but also (informationally constrained) efficient.
Finally, we note two future research directions. An important extension is a two population model of firms and workers, to make a closed model of efficiency wage theory (e.g., Okuno, 1981, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) . If there is an equilibrium with a contrasting strategy distribution on the worker side, e.g., cooperative workers and non-cooperative workers, it gives a further rationale to equilibrium unemployment in a homogeneous worker population.
We placed our model of VSRPD as a large social game, in which players not only choose actions but also with whom to play the game in a large society. It can be a first step towards the research of endogenous network formation with consideration of withinnetwork strategic behavior. There is a large literature of network formation researches (see for example, Jackson, 2008) but they usually omit the strategic behavior within a network.
We showed that pairwise cooperative networks (between c 0 -players) and non-networking players can co-exist in the society. This also implies that it is not guaranteed that all agents in the society end up in a (long-term) network.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
PROOF OF REMARK 2: Consider entry of c 1 -strategy. For any ϵ > 0, let
That is, c 1 -strategy can invade the bimorphic distribution.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Since p * is a locally stable Nash equilibrium, it suffices to prove the condition (ii) for any q = (q c 0 ,
For any ϵ ∈ (0, 1), let the post-entry distribution be
.).
Note that, q ∈ E(δ) implies that x c 0 (ϵ) ≦ α cd (δ), for any ϵ ∈ (0, 1), and x s (ϵ) = ϵq s for all 
For c 1 -and d 1 -strategy, the post-entry average payoff depends only on x c 0 (ϵ), x c 1 (ϵ),
. To see this, take c 1 -strategy. Its in-match payoff is g against c 0 -strategy, d against d 0 -strategy, d + δ 2 c 1−δ 2 against c 1 -strategy, and d + δ 2 ℓ against any other strategy. Therefore the post-entry average payoff is
27
We can simplify these as follows. (To conserve space, we omit (ϵ) except for x c 0 (ϵ) in the following.) Let x 1 := x c 1 + x d1+ and α 1 := x c 1 /x 1 (this is independent of ϵ). Then
, which is the expected length of partnerships for c 0 , under a distribution with its share α. Using these, we have that
For c T -and d T -strategy with T ≧ 2, it is now clear that the post-entry average payoff depends only on
, and
Similarly,
} .
There existsε 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for any ϵ ∈ (0,ε 0 ],
In this region, d 0 -strategy has lower average payoff than that of c 0 -strategy.
(See Figure 2 .) (13) means that it suffices to prove that for each T = 1, 2, . . . and sufficiently small ϵ, entrant strategies d T and c T earn less than d 0 -strategy does;
Step 1:
Proof of Step 1: To show (14), it suffices to prove that the second to the last terms of (12) are all negative, that is
Hence, for each t ≧ 1, there existsε t ∈ (0, 1) such that for any ϵ ∈ (0,ε t ), (12) and (15) imply that for any T = 1, 2, . . .,
This completes the proof of Step 1. //
Step 2: For any T = 1, 2, . . ., there existsε c T ∈ (0, 1) such that
Proof of Step 2: Again, it suffices to prove that second to the T + 1-th terms of (11) are all negative. But we have already shown in (15) that the second to T -th terms are all negative for any ϵ ∈ (0, min t≦T −1εt ). It remains to prove that the last term is negative for some range of ϵ, that is, there existsε T ∈ (0, 1) such that
The assumption q ∈ E(δ) only implies that α T < α cd (δ), hence we have two cases.
In this case (see Figure 2) , we have v cd (c 0 ;
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there existsα(
See also Figure 7 . If α cd (δ) = α T , then clearly there existsα( 
In either case,α(α T ) < α cd (δ) holds. Hence there existsε T ∈ (0, 1) such that for any
In summary, for any α T < α cd (δ), there existsε T = min{ε 0 ,ε T } ∈ (0, 1) such that (11), (15), and (16) imply that for any T = 1, 2, . . .,
This completes the proof of Step 2 and the Proposition as well.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF REMARK 3: First, take an arbitrary T < ∞ and let
On the other hand,
Note that the denominator of the coefficient of the second term of
For any (α 0 , α 1 , . . . , α T ), the average payoff functions are formulated as follows.
for each t = 1, 2, . . . , T , the expected length of partnerships that c t -strategy experiences is
is that of d T -strategy. Using these, we have
so that the average payoffs coincide.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
We show that
We first arrange the post-entry distribution into the relative ratio form. (For notational simplicity, we write α cd = α cd (δ).) Notice that the post-entry distribution is
We want to arrange this as the relative ratio form such that
where α P E t is the relative post-entry ratio of c t -strategy against the total share of c t+1 , . . . , c T , (20) can be arranged iter-atively to cancel out numerators and denominators as
Therefore, for each t = 1, 2, . . . , T , let
Then (20) and (21) coincide. Note also that when ϵ = 0, Using these relative ratios, we can compute the average post-entry payoffs of the strategies and differentiate them. As a preparation, note that (23) ∂α
and, for any t = 1, 2, . . . , T , by computation we have
From (18) and (19) 
From (22) and (24), at ϵ = 0, many terms disappear.
∂v(c t ; p
, where the last equality comes from (22) 
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: We first show a Lemma which generalizes Lemma 2 of Fujiwara-Greve, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Suzuki (2013) .
LEMMA 2 For any T = 0, 1, 2, . . . and any α ∈ (0, 1),
That is, if d T -and c T -strategies are payoff-equivalent, the bimorphic distribution is a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: From the derivation of the Best Reply Condition (7),
Hence we show the last inequality. Figure 9 .) Therefore, the continuation path for c T +k -strategy must be (D, D) for T periods (in total, T +1+T periods from the beginning) and after that (C, C) with probability α and (C, D) with probability (1 − α). Hence k must be T + 1, and thus the "next" trust-building strategy to be included should be c T +2(T +1) -strategy and so on. The payoff equivalence at α = α T (δ) is analogous to Lemma 1.
